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NINTH CIRCUIT COURT
OF APPEALS
Geary v. Renne,

_F.2d___, 89 D.A.R. 9407,
No. 88-2875 (9th Cir., July 24, 1989).

Ban On Party Endorsements In
Nonpartisan Races Upheld
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
has upheld a California constitutional
amendment banning all party endorsements in nonpartisan races, which includes judgeships, school boards, county
supervisors, and city councils.
The ban was added to the California
Constitution, Article II, section 6(b), in
1986, in a constitutional amendment proposed by the legislature. The measure
was prompted by an earlier California
Supreme Court decision permitting Republican party opposition to the confirmation vote on three then-Justices of
the Supreme Court. The provision was
supported by organizations representing
judges, city councils, county supervisors,
and school boards, and opposed by the
major political parties and California
Common Cause. Suit was filed by Democratic Party activists in San Francisco
against the City Attorney, who began
deleting party endorsements of local candidates from the voter pamphlet.
In an opinion by Judges Trott and
Sneed, the court held that although the
ban is a substantial limitation on first
amendment rights and therefore suspect
and subject to strict judicial scrutiny,
the ban is narrowly tailored to meet the
state's compelling interest in ensuring
that political parties do not have an
undue influence on candidates or voters
in nonpartisan races. The court, taking
special note of an amicus brief filed by
Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley, cited
the historical basis for nonpartisan elections stemming from corrupt political
machines at the turn of the century, and
the need to encourage and protect "independent-minded persons who refuse to
toe the party line." The court made
several specific references to the perceived need to ensure no political influence in judicial confirmation elections,
"to avoid control over [judges1 fate by
political parties."
Judge Canby dissented, noting that
the ban is a direct attempt to suppress
information-the preference of a political
party-precisely because the voters might
listen to it and act upon it. The threat to
judicial independence, he would have
held, is due to the fact of the election,
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not to any endorsements.
The decision is another in a series of
challenges to California endorsement
bans. In February, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that California could not
constitutionally ban endorsements by
county central committees of candidates
within a party's primary elections. Eu v.
San Francisco County Democratic Central Commiltee, _U.S.__, 109 S.Ct.
1013 (1989). (See CRLR Vol. 9, No. 2
(Spring 1989) p. 125 for details.)

Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc.,
_F.Zd___, 89 D.A.R. 8880,
No. 86-3833 (9th Cir., July 10, 1989).

A11orneys' Fee Enhancement For
Risk of Loss
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
has approved the use of a multiplier of
1.33 in an antitrust action to compensate
prevailing plaintiffs for the risk of loss.
The underlying action was an antitrust case which went through two jury
trials, one appellate opinion, and a petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme
Court, resulting in an eventual award of
$1,349,700 in treble damages. Fees were
sought, and the undisputed lodestar
amount of $1,284,896 was enhanced by
one-third solely because of the uncertainty of ever recovering a fee.
On appeal the enhancement was upheld, even under the tests in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley II),
483 U.S. 711 (1987). In that case, the
Supreme Court prohibited enhancements
to fees based on uncertainty and contingency of recovery, unless the plaintiff
faced substantial difficulties in finding
counsel for the case in the local market
and the multiplier sought is related to
contingent fee cases as a class, not to
the difficulty of the particular case. In
the instant case, the district court cited
testimony about the peculiar difficulties
in obtaining counsel in antitrust cases,
and that no law firm would take the
cases if the recovery in fees was no more
than that available for work compensated
on a noncontingent basis for hourly
work. However, the court did reduce
the award to eliminate any enhancement
for hours spent on the fee request itself,
since the risks of nonrecovery were presumably diminished.
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UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURTS
United States ex rel.
Truong v. Northrop Corp.,
_F. Supp.__,
No. CV 88-967-MRP (Aug. 11, 1989).

Court Upholds Whistleblower lAw
In the third case in as many months,
a district court has upheld the constitutionality of a law that allows private
citizens to sue government contractors
for fraud against the government.
At issue was the False Claims Act,
31 U.S.C. section 3730, which permits a
plaintiff to bring a "qui tam" action
against a government contractor, regardless of whether the individual has suffered any personal damages. The case
must be filed under seal, and the Department of Justice has sixty days to decide
whether to pursue the case itself or allow
the private party to prosecute it. In either
case, the private party is entitled to a
share of the eventual proceeds. The law
was originally passed in 1863 in the
wake of Civil War scandals in procurement. It was little used thereafter, and
extensively amended in 1986, principally
to enlarge the qui tam provisions. It
applies to all federal government contractors, although its origin and most
cases involve military contracts.
This action was filed by three former
Northrop employees, alleging fraudulent
billing in the B-2 bomber program by
Northrop. Northrop sought dismissal on
grounds that the qui tam provisions violated the federal constitution's separation
of powers and appointments clauses, and
because the plaintiffs lacked standing.
U.S. District Court Judge Marianna
Pfaelzer rejected all three arguments,
holding that there is no constitutional
infirmity in the qui tam provision, because the act is not a "subterfuge" for
congressional control and therefore does
not interfere with the executive branch
responsibility to enforce the laws. On
the standing claim, the court held the
law does not violate the Article II requirement of a "case or controversy", in
that the government had a "very clear
demonstration of injury", and the plaintiff had a "personal stake in the litigation", both of which assured the "underlying purpose of Article Ill which .. .is to
ensure the genuine adversariness of litigation."
The opinion accords with two recent
decisions rejecting nearly identical attacks
on the False Claims Act, in United States
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ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopter, 87
D.A.R. 7687, No. CV 87-1840-WDK
(C.D.Cal., June I, 1989) (see CRLR
Vol. 9, No. 3 (Summer 1989) p. 131),
and United States ex rel. Newsham v.
Lockheed Missiles & Space, No. C8820009-RPA (N.D.Cal., June 1989).

CALIFORNIA
SUPREME COURT
McHugh v. Santa Monica
Rent Control Board,
_Cal. 3d_, No. L.A. 32062,
89 D.A.R. 10519 (Aug. 17, 1989).

Administrative Agency May Adjudicate
Rents But Not Impose Penalties
The California Supreme Court has
held that the Santa Monica Rent Control
Board may constitutionally act as an
adjudicatory body to establish rents and
resolve disputes between tenants and landlords, but the Board may not impose
treble damages or permit immediate rent
withholding without opportunity for judicial review.
The Santa Monica Rent Control
Board is empowered to promulgate rent
regulations, including rent controls, and
hear and determine complaints regarding
those regulations. The relevant ordinance
imposes on a landlord who violates the
law a penalty of either $500 or three
times the excess rent collected. That
ordinance permits the dispute to be adjudicated by way of a civil action or in
an adjudicatory hearing before the Board,
which has the power to permit the penalty to be deducted from future rent
payments. Review of the latter may be
had by writ of administrative mandamus
under Code of Civil Procedure section
1094.5.
Plaintiff was charged with collecting
illegal rents from tenants. Following hearing, the Board found that the rents were
excessive, and ruled the tenants were
entitled to recovery of the excess multiplied by three, plus various costs and
interest. Plaintiff filed a petition for a
writ, alleging that the adjudication violated the California constitutional delegation of judicial powers solely to the
judiciary. The writ was granted, and the
court issued an injunction preventing
enforcement of any portion of the complaint provision of the rent control law.
The Supreme Court, per Chief Justice
Lucas joined by Justices Mosk, Eagleson,
Kaufman, and Arguelles, treated the issue
as one of first impression, explicitly
declining to follow prior precedent on
whether administrative agencies may ex140

ercise judicial powers as lacking in
explanatory basis and out of step with
an intervening fifty years of decisional
law. The court canvassed an exhaustive
review of decisions from California and
other states on the issue, and announced
a new rule. The court created a two-part
test for constitutional adjudications by
an agency, including those involving licenses, revocations, and restitutionary
monetary remedies: (I) the adjudication
activities must be authorized by statute
and necessary to effectuate the agency's
primary regulatory purposes; and (2) the
"essential" judicial power (the power to
make enforceable, binding judgments)
remains ultimately with the courts,
through judicial review.
Using this test, the court held that
the Board could adjudicate the proper
level of rent and order restitution of the
excess. However, the court also held
that the Board could not authorize the
tenant to immediately withhold the
amount awarded as restitution, for to
do so would effectively preclude any
judicial review: the tenant could withhold instantly, and use the order as a
defense to an unlawful detainer action,
and effectively recoup the entire sum
before a section 1094.5 action could be
filed and prosecuted. As an alternative,
an order to take effect after thirty days,
to allow for judicial review, was held
permissible.
The court also summarily struck the
treble damages authority as "arbitrary",
and rejected a claim that a landlord had
a right to a jury trial.
Justices Panelli and Eagleson concurred to explain that the decision would
not permit "an agency to award substantial general compensatory damages" even
if this would further the agency's purpose. Justice Broussard concurred and
dissented, and would have upheld the
treble damages remedy, and the power
to order immediate relief.

California Common Cause v.
Supervisors,
_Cal. 3d__, 89 D.A.R. 10803,
No. S00l833 (Aug. 24, 1989).

County Not Required to Deputize
Employees To Conduct
Voter Registration
The Supreme Court has ruled that a
county is not required to deputize employees to act as registrars to register
voters in county offices.
Plaintiffs originally filed smt m superior court in Los Angeles to force the
county to implement a voter registration

plan by deputizing county employees
who have frequent contact with minoritv
and low-income citizens to increase their
registration. Plaintiffs provided statistical
data to show underregistration and underrepresentation in voting by these populations, with studies showing the disparate effect of registration requirements
on these groups. The county contended
that education and age were more likely
important factors than race or income.
The trial court granted a preliminary
injunction, compelling the county to create a program deputizing county workers
who have frequent contact with lowincome and minority citizens. The injunction was designed both to force compliance with the requirements of Elections Code sections 302 and 304, which
provide for deputization of registrars
and require the Secretary of State to
formulate regulations for voter outreach
programs, and as a remedy for other
violations of the Elections Code. The
court of appeal affirmed.
The Supreme Court, per Justices
Lucas, Panelli, Eagleson, Kaufman, and
Arguelles, reversed. The court relied on
technical rules for writs of mandate to
hold that there is_no mandatory duty to
achieve maximum voter registration or
to use a particular means, only a general
directive leaving the methods of achieving such a goal to the county's discretion,
and therefore no writ could issue. The
court also held that, whether or not the
county had violated other provisions of
the Elections Code, the appropriate action for a court was to order compliance,
not to fashion creative remedies.
Justice Broussard, with Justice Mosk,
dissented and would have held that, given
that the right to vote is fundamental,
any burdens on that right are subject to
strictest judicial scrutiny. Because plaintiffs had established that preregistration
requirements disproportionately disenfranchised certain groups such as minorities and the poor, and because the legislature has imposed upon counties the
duty to ensure the highest possible registration, Justice Broussard would have
affirmed the lower court.

Center for Public Interest Law v.
Fair Political Practices Commission,
No. S007758 (Aug. 17, 1989).

Court Declines to Review
Proposition 68 Case
The Supreme Court has declined to
review the decision of the Fourth District
Court of Appeal holding that Proposition 73's ban on public funding of cam-
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paigns voids Proposition 68's creation
of a Campaign Reform Fund. (See CRLR
Vol. 9, No. 3 (Summer 1989) p. 132 and
Vol. 9, No. I (Winter 1989) pp. 111-12
for background information.)

CALIFORNIA COURTS
OF APPEAL
Taxpayers to Limit Campaign
Spending v. Fair Political
Practices Commission,
_Cal. App. 3d~ 89 D.A.R. 9345,
No. B039177 (Aug. I, 1989).
Portions of Proposition 68 Upheld
and Harmonized With
Proposition 73
In the latest in a series of decisions
by courts and others attempting to reconcile Propositions 68 and 73, the Second
District Court of Appeal is the first to
hold that Proposition 73 does not entirely void Proposition 68, and therefore
large portions of Proposition 68 may
take effect.
Propositions 68 and 73 both were
passed by the voters at the June 1988
election. (For a full description of each,
see CRLR Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer 1988)
p. 1.) Proposition 68 was placed on the
ballot by a coalition of good government
and business groups, and applies only to
legislative offices. Proposition 73 was
placed on the ballot by a coalition of
three incumbent legislators and applies
to legislative, statewide, and local elections. Proposition 73 received a higher
affirmative vote; thus, both must be implemented, but Proposition 73 takes precedence over Proposition 68 in areas of
irreconcilable conflict. The FPPC opined
that most of Proposition 68 conflicted
with Proposition 73; the remainder of
Proposition 68 was not severable; and
therefore none of Proposition 68 could
take effect. The principal sponsor of
Proposition 68 sought a writ of mandate
directly in the court of appeal to review
that decision.
A unanimous court, per Justices Croskey, Klein, and Arabian, issued the writ.
In a lengthy opinion that reviews every
part of both propositions, the court held
that principles of statutory interpretation
require that the two initiatives be reconciled if at all possible, with the goal of
preserving all parts of Proposition 68
not directly and immediately in conflict
with Proposition 73. The court rejected
a "thematic approach" urged by Proposition 73 supporters as essentially a political analysis, not a legal one. The court
specifically rejected the Proposition 73
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supporters' argument, which was also
the basis of their campaign, that the
voters were choosing between Propositions 68 and 73-holding instead that
the intent of the voters was clearly to
enact both propositions and the judicial
task is to find a way to preserve that
intent. Only specific provisions of Proposition 68 which are in direct conflict and
irreconcilable with Proposition 73 may
not take effect. This requires a section
by section analysis and an effort to harmonize.
Using this section by section analysis,
the court upheld all of the following
provisions of Proposition 68: a ban on
contributions during non-election years;
limitations on total or aggregate contributions by a contributor; calculations
and limitations on aggregating group
and family contributions; regulations on
return of contributions; regulation of
loans; regulations of the timing of contributions in primary and general elections;
and amendments to the criminal penalties for violations. A writ issued to require
the FPPC to enforce these provisions.
The court made its order effective prospectively only.

AFL-CIO v. Deukmejian,
_Cal. App. 3d~ 89 D.A.R. 9345,
No. C002364 (July 20, 1989).
Governor Required to List All
Carcinogens Under Proposition 65
The Third District Court of Appeal
affirmed a trial court order requiring
the Governor to include on the list of
chemicals required by Proposition 65 all
chemicals shown to cause cancer in animals; the list is not limited to human
carcinogens only.
Proposition 65, passed at the November 1986 general election, requires the
Governor to publish a list of chemicals
"known to the state of California to
cause cancer." The first list was required
on March I, 1987, to include at a minimum certain specified chemicals that are
listed as human and animal carcinogens
by national and international agencies.
The list is to be supplemented by the
Governor periodically. Following listing,
businesses using those chemicals must
provide warnings to workers and consumers of any exposure. The Governor
refused to list, all of the referenced
chemicals, and limited the initial list to
known human carcinogens only. This
became known as the "short list", and
included approximately 10% of all the
chemicals referenced by the statute. Attorney General John Van de Kamp ad-
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vised the Governor that his action was
contrary to the law, and refused to
defend the action when suit was filed by
labor and environmental groups. (For
complete background information, see
CRLR Vol. 7, No. 3 (Summer 1987) p.
138 and Vol. 7, No. 2 (Spring 1987) pp.
15-16.)
The Sacramento County Superior
Court overruled a demurrer filed by the
Governor, and issued a preliminary injunction compelling inclusion of all the
chemicals on the list. On appeal, the
appellate court affirmed in a unanimous
opinion by Justices Puglia, Sparks, and
Marie:. The court held that Health and
Safety Code section 25249.8, which created the list, specifically requires inclusion of substances referenced in Labor
Code section 6382. That statute requires
Cal-OSHA to publish a list including all
carcinogens, human and animal, as determined by the International Agency for
Research on Cancer and the National
Toxicology Program. The court rejected
the Governor's argument that although
the statute specifically referenced these
lists, he had discretion to exclude any
chemicals. The court held instead that,
at least as to the initial list, the listing
was a purely ministerial act not subject
to discretion. The immediate impact of
the decision is limited, as the Governoracting on the advice of the statutorily
mandated Scientific Advisory Panelhas added most of the substances since
March I, 1987.

Sokolow v. County of San Mateo,
_Cal. App. 3d~ 89 D.A.R. 10540,
No. A039117 (Aug. 17, 1989).
Plaintiff Entitled to Attorneys' Fees
For Partial Success
The First District Court of Appeal
has held that a plaintiff in a civil rights
suit is entitled to attorneys' fees even
though the lawsuit did not achieve all of
plaintifrs goals.
Plaintiff in the underlying suit challenged the male-only policy of the Mounted Patrol of San Mateo County. The
Patrol was affiliated with the county
sheriff, consisting of unsworn volunteers.
They were deputized by the Sheriff, performed tasks for and were trained by
the Sheriff, wore uniforms and insignia
identifying them as deputies, and acted
as deputies under color of Jaw. Only
men were allowed to join. Plaintiff, a
woman, sought admission; she was denied, and sued under federal and state
theories. The suit sought to permit her
entry or, in the alternative, to sever all
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ties between the county and the Patrol.
Judgment in her favor was entered. The
Patrol chose to sever all ties, and both it
and the county ended all ties and references. No appeal was filed.
On application for attorneys' fees,
the court denied fees, finding that plaintiff was not a prevailing party in that
she had neither gained admission for
herself nor any one else. On appeal, the
court, per Justices Merrill, White, and
Barry-Deal, reversed. The court held that
plaintiff was unquestionably the prevailing party and so was entitled to fees and
costs. However, the court also held that
the award may be limited where the
success is less than complete, and relied
on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424
( 1983), interpreting awards under federal
law. The court grafted a similar limitation on state attorneys' fee law under
Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.
Although the court made no specific
finding in this particular case, the court
did emphasize that the inquiry on remand should not be a parsing to determine which particular causes of action
or legal theories prevailed, but rather
attention must be paid to the actual
results sought and those achieved.

SUPERIOR COURTS
People v. Jenkins,
No. 89-M-213 (Lassen County
Justice Court).
First Criminal Prosecution/or
Violating Open Meeting Laws
In the first known case of its kind, a
criminal complaint was filed on April
28, 1989, against a local entity for violating the Ralph M. Brown Act, Government Code section 54950 et seq., the
California open meetings law applicable
to local governments. The case was filed
by the Lassen County District Attorney
in Susanville against the Lassen County
Board of Supervisors for holding an
alleged illegal meeting on September 27,
1988, and unlawfully "taking action," as
that term is used in the Brown Act. The
Brown Act was amended recently to
allow for civil actions, which are frequently brought by news organizations
and private citizens.
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